It is only with the greatest hesitation that I raise again this crucial question, which has accompanied Christendom since the days of the Apostles. Not only is the question of great fundamental and historical importance; it also raises strong emotions.
Who does not recall the words of the Apostle Paul to the church at Colossae that they should above all beware lest anyone spoil them through philosophy -by which he probably meant the philosophy of the Gnostics (Colossians 2:8)? Who does not recall the warning to the church at Corinth that the fool- [139] ishness of God, revealed in the crucified Son of Man, is stronger than the wisdom of the Greeks (I Corinthians 1:25)? Thus the question at issue here is one with regard to which extremely divergent standpoints are defended and the greatest imaginable differences of opinion have arisen -differences which have led on more than one occasion to schism, sectarianism, and mutual estrangement.
The controversies surrounding the problem of how to assess contemporary culture and modern philosophy have often flared up also in Reformational Christianity in the Netherlands and North America. Key terms in this debate have always been the words 'antithesis' and 'synthesis'. The word 'antithesis' denotes the fundamental opposition that would exist between the Christian conception of life and the conceptions of life found in a world estranged from God. The word 'synthesis' is used to indicate the possibility, in principle, of connecting Christianity in one way or another with operative conceptions from ancient pagan or modern secularized philosophy.
It is well known how Neocalvinism, following in the line of Abraham Kuyper, took sides. The biblical point of departure was Genesis 3:15, the divinely proclaimed enmity between the 'seed of the woman,' say Christ and his own, and the 'seed of the serpent,' say Satan and his own. The whole world and the whole of world history were regarded as involved in this struggle between Christ's kingdom and Satan's power. In all fields of life, it was asserted, discipleship of Christ and acknowledgement of his kingship necessarily required an 'antithesis,' a separate vision and responsibility, yes, even separate forms of Christian organization set up in opposition to already existing patterns of culture and organization.
From here, lines were drawn also in the direction of philosophical and scientific thought. The result was the concept of Christian scholarship versus non-Christian scholarship or in any case -but in this restriction there was already a difficulty -the concept of Christian philosophy versus non-Christian philosophy. The practice of scholarship and philosophy ought to be based on 'palingenesis' (that is, rebirth), as Kuyper said, or on 'Reformed principles,' as the early Free University stipulated, or on the 'Christian worldview,' as Herman Bavinck asserted, or on the 'Christian groundmotive,' as Herman Dooyeweerd put it, or on the 'Calvinist view of world and life,' as D.H.Th. Vollenhoven maintained.
2 In a word, antithesis was commended, also in the practice of science.
This antithesis in science implied, in the nature of the case, a struggle on two fronts.
In the first place, it meant the rejection of de development of non-Christian science and hence criticism of Darwinism in the natural sciences, of materialism in the human sciences, and of liberalism in the social scien- [140] ces. In the second place, it meant the rejection of the so-called synthesis thought believed to be embodied in Roman
Catholicism and in Old Protestantism, where the religious antithesis would be obscured in a subtle attempt to accommodate Christian belief to the spirit of the age.
To this sketch I would append a few remarks. First, I believe I can assert candidly that the philosophical development in the Netherlands at the Free University and subsequently also in the Association for Calvinist Philosophy-think of Kuyper, Bavinck, Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven-has been based mainly on the antithetical assumption I have just described. In the second place, I want to assert that now, after half a century of Neo-reformational philosophizing-to which this issue of Philosophia Reformata pays tribute-the time has come to engage once again in fundamental reflection on the assumptions of this philosophizing, and then in particular on the doctrine of the religious antithesis and its implications for philosophy.
In the third place, I want to assert-this will be the central thesis of my is a point to be made regarding inverse transformation (sections 7-8). Finally, I shall undertake to show why a Christian transformational philosophy could be characterized as dynamic and contextual philosophy (sections 9-10).
Questions regarding so-called synthesis philosophy
From the countless discussions that have been carried on in Reformational circles about synthesis and antithesis in philosophy, it is clear that both terms are fraught with special difficulties. Let us first look more closely at the term 'synthesis philosophy.'
The term implies that there are thinkers who strive for a synthesizing, that is, a connecting of the Christian sphere of faith, or of philosophical conceptions that would flow forth from this doctrine, with philosophical conceptions of ancient pagan or modern humanist provenance.
In Neo-reformational circles such a synthesis is generally rejected on the grounds that the intended connection boils down in fact to an accommodation of Christian belief to the spirit of the age and the philosophy of the day. Thus synthesis philosophy is rejected in principle.
Yet there is something remarkable to be noted here. his City of God so clearly showed to be an all-encompassing global struggle -has something to do in some way or another with scientific reflection -for it surely and certainly does -but whether this involvement must lead in all seriousness to an exclusively antithetical stand at all levels of philosophical and scientific praxis.
The problem can be considered in terms of principle or from a practical standpoint.
With respect to principle, it must be seriously doubted whether speaking of religious antithesis in terms of an 'absolute contradiction' does not overstate the case and whether upon further reflection such terminology does not turn out to belong to a always require communication?
The sheer necessity of communication
Communication plays a crucial role in science today. The results of research in be called scientific only if they can be justified before a broad scientific forum. Normal science is even defined for the purposes of some philosophies of science as research which is done within a paradigm, that is, within the .framework of the shared assumptions of a scientific community.
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Something of the same sort obtains for philosophical thought as well, which day can be called anything but individual reflection. Nowadays, scholarly inquiry is often carried on in long-term research projects. Such research projects engage philosophers of diverse plumage in shared acceptance of certain points of departure, methods, and objectives.
The necessity of communication arises not only from the demands of contemporary research in a complex society. It arises also from the nature of the scholarly, scientific way of thought as such. Scholars have no other recourse than to set forth their conception of things in language, in the categories of Ought and within the horizons of understanding existing in their own time. is especially true of philosophers. If philosophers desire to be relevant, they need to articulate their ideas in such a way that they respond to the [144] questions and expectations, the burdens and exigencies appearing within these communal intellective horizons.
Christian philosophers too are consigned to the philosophical and ideological discussions of their own day, even if for no other purpose than the development of their own ideas along the way. Various non-Christian conceptions are not so much starting points [aanknopingspunten] as they are points of contact [aangrijpingspunten] fostering development of the distinctive conceptions of Christian scholars.
Certainly Christian philosophers will often feel the calling and experience the need to reformulate the questions that have arisen and the answers that have been given in the light of Scripture and also to exchange them if need be for 9 I mean here conceptions as developed by Thomas S. Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962; 2nd ed., 1970) . It will be clear in view of what I have said thus far that I do not consider his sociological an d psychological approach to the phenomenon of science, aided by 'paradigms', and 'disciplinary matrices,' to be adequate. Moreover, the concept of communication is also central in the philosophies of science of Kuhn's opponents, including Imre Lakatos and Jürgen Habermas. instructions, demanded silver and gold objects and also clothing and that the Lord favorably disposed the Egyptians so that the people got what they asked. Literally, it is written: 'And they spoiled the Egyptians' (Exodus 12:36).
The Church Fathers and the theme of spoliation
It is interesting to note that the early Church Fathers more than once seized upon this theme of plundering the Egyptians in order to clarify and defend their attitude towards ancient philosophy. Their argumentation was this. Just as the children of Israel were One thing is certain: it should never be our intention to accept uncritically ideas from pre-Christian or post-Christian cultures. Equally unacceptable would be to make an external adaptation of such ideas to Christian doctrines in the manner so often undertaken in patristic and medieval thought. The appropriation of non-Christian learning may not consist in external adaptation to but must consist rather in critical assimilation into a Christian view of reality.
The example of the children of Israel is illustrative. They spoiled the Egyptians of their gold and silver, to be sure. But initially the people carried on uncritically with
Egyptian animal worship by setting up the golden calf to the cry, 'Those are your gods, o Israel, who brought you up out of Egypt' (Exodus 32:4). Only later did the Israelites learn to appropriate the gold in a much deeper and, indeed, critical sense of the word. Servants of God themselves, they then also offered their gold in service to God. They melted it down to make the furnishings for the tabernacle (Exodus 35).
This story from de Bible can perhaps serve to clarify the meaning of transformation.
Transformation in the normative sense of the word means to me the critical appropriation and assimilation of non-Christian learning, so that it can be truly integrated into a Christian view of reality and used in service to God. Critical assimilation means smelting and refining, and thus also exposing and relinquishing all that can not stand the purifying fire of criticism.
Critical assimilation implies, in other words, that the valuable insights of those of other persuasions must be shelled from the pods of their worldviews, that they must be pulled up out of the religious ideological soil in which they have thus far been accustomed to flourish. Thus Calvin could speak of the outstanding insights of the ancient philosophers and jurists, but then separated from the self-righteousness of heathendom. Thus even Kuyper could at times allude to the outstanding insights of a
Darwin, but then separated from Darwin's evolutionistic system he detested.
To my mind, we must also recognize something of such a critical transformational intent in the works of the Greek and Latin Church Fathers, whom many amongst us have tagged without nuance as 'synthesis philosophers.' It is undoubtedly true that, measured by biblical standards, they often depreciated the material world and human corporeal existence. Yet it is equally true that compared with the philosophical standards prevalent at the time (leaving aside rare cases such as Marcion and Mani) they revalued this ubiquitously devalued material reality by relating it in one way or another to God, the good Creator of heaven and earth. Such a critical transformational task lies upon our way as well. For a Christcentered reflection on man and society, it seems to me that one of the most important categories in modern humanistic philosophy would be the concept of 'alienation'. Now, I believe that I as a Christian may adopt such a key concept if I separate it from the ideological context of historical materialism and show that for me alienation means something just a little more concrete, more personal and more radical than estrangement in modern labor re-[147]lations, which indeed so often impede man's self-realization. Alienation is arguably a basic-notion to be taken and scrutinized as spoils. That is to say, Christians have to admit that there is a great ,deal of alienation in modern society. But we must dissect this marxist notion until sin is disclosed at the foundation of all human and societal alienation: man, estranged from God.
Inverse transformation
The 
The 'dialectics' of transformation and its inversion
Looking back on the centuries-long tradition of Christian philosophical thought, we have to notice that the world of culture really is hardly neutral at all. On the one hand, we can see how believers have attempted to address the current questions of their cultures and so to provide an account of the implications of the Christian faith without surrendering their Christian starting point. On the other hand, we also find that this involvement with current debates did not always produce salutary results, that it did not mean reformation and transformation exclusively but slippage as well.
What was often true of individual thinkers was also true of the church in general.
Having become a cultural power in its own right, the church itself proved to be vulnerable. On the one hand, the church has become a transformational blessing for culture; on the other hand, it has been cast to and fro by every wind of doctrine and has all too often been the duped victim of a deceptive culture. The church's openness to the world is at the same time an opening for the world.
In short, transformation and inverse transformation are always simultaneously at stake. That is what one could call in a philosophical and thus not fully adequate terminology 'the dialectics of transformation and-inverse transformation.' This phrase represents the vulnerability of Christ's church in general. It represents in particular the vulnerability of individual Christian philosophers, whose calling it is to think through the doctrines of their times and who in doing so can easily lose their footing.
Earlier I referred to the religious antithesis, the enmity between the kingdom of God and the powers of evil, as a struggle in which the philosopher, too, is involved.
I said at that point that this struggle cannot be opened up for discussion by the adoption either of an antithetical or of a synthetical standpoint in philosophy. My thesis was rather that every type of Christian philosophizing, to the extent that it is truly Christian, implies willy-nilly an antithetical ferment and that every type of Christian philosophizing, to the extent that it is truly philosophical, contains willynilly a synthesizing element. Does this mean that all types of Christian philosophy are of equal value? Does this mean that in the gloom of history all philosophical cats are gray? [149] That is the last thing I would want to maintain! But the religious struggle between
God and the powers of evil at the philosophical level can best be understood, I believe, not in terms of antithetical versus synthetical standpoints but in terms of what I have called the 'dialectics' of transformation and inverse transformation, a 'dialectics' in which the blessing of Christianity is all too easily turned into a curse. We call this curse down upon us if, whether through accommodation or through isolation, we neglect our transformational task.
Reciprocity of transformation. The dynamic character of Christian philosophy
If the view of transformational philosophy presented here is correct, then two important consequences follow with regard to the character of Christian philosophy.
Christian philosophy , ought to be dynamic. And Christian philosophy ought to be contextual. I wish to provide a brief explanation of each of these characteristics.
First, a word concerning the dynamic character of Christian philosophizing.
Sometimes it is asserted that there have been so astonishingly many systems of "Antithesis, Synthesis, and the Idea of Transformational Philosophy" Philosophia Reformata 51 (1986), 138-54 Christian philosophy from the days of the apologists and Church Fathers to today because Christian philosophy tried to wed itself in every new epoch to the spirit of the age. It is then asserted that the real task should have been to frame one lasting Christian system of philosophy for all times. What are we to think of that?
The objection that Christian philosophy has adapted itself far too much to the spirit of the age in the course of the centuries is probably well taken. Yet the alternative, i.e.
that There is, moreover, a complication. In the relation between Christian philosophical tradition and other philosophical developments, the matter is one of influence that goes forth and returns again. We must not forget that this so-called general history of philosophy, even after it had loosened itself from the Christian intellectual tradition at the beginning of modern times, remained ineradicably marked by such dominant conceptions as those of Augustine, Thomas, and Luther.
I cannot imagine modern historical and utopian consciousness without Augustine's philosophizing has perhaps thus far produced some impressive systems of Christian philosophy, but -so the demurral -in practice they are of little value.
Is this complaint not in some sense correct? And is that not the result of a tendency amongst Christians -especially in Neocalvinist circles -still excessively to harbor the illusion that they can advance philosophical reflection entirely with their own people and entirely with their own devices?
If we genuinely desire to philosophize in the spirit of Christ, then we shall [151] have to do as He did, that is, seek people out where they are to be found: in a world continue to bear witness to the one truth that is in Jesus Christ. We can understand this Truth, however, only together 'with all the saints' (Ephesians 3:18). The idea of contextual philosophy tries to make room for this 'together with all saints.'
